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Abstract
In safety-critical systems, software safety analysis aims to provide confidence that the risk
associated with the software is acceptable. Accidents in safety-critical systems are usually
associated with the occurrence of multiple failures in the system components, or with the lack
of adequate error containment mechanisms. The process of safety analysis can be enhanced if
the appropriate abstractions are provided for the modelling and analysis of the system
components and their interactions. This paper shows how a co-operative object-oriented
approach can be used in the analysis of the safety properties of a system by focusing on the
interactions between its components. The feasibility of the approach is demonstrated in terms
of a case study which deals with the safety procedures associated with the launching and
flight of a sounding rocket.
Keywords: safety-critical systems, safety analysis, objects, collaborations, formal models,
sounding rockets
1. Introduction
The causes for major accidents are invariably related with the failure of multiple components
of a system, rather than with the failure of a single component. A major reason for this to
happen is the inherent difficulty of extracting behavioural dependencies from the
specifications of components. Moreover, if the identification and modelling of these
dependencies are left for the late stages of software development then the task of performing
the analysis of the safety properties of a system becomes extremely complex, hence prone to
errors. In this paper we employ an approach where all the interactions between components
are identified and modelled at the early phases of the software development. As the
development progresses, the interactions are refined to include details from the design and
implementation of the system. An advantage of this approach, compared with more
conventional ones, is that it allows the analysis of the safety properties of a system to
emphasise the interactions between components, in addition to the behavioural analysis of
individual system components, which characterises the more conventional approaches.
When describing a system, the choice of a modelling abstraction depends on which aspects of
the problem have to be emphasised or suppressed. In this paper, for the benefit of safety
analysis, we would like to emphasise the interactions between the components. In a co-
operative object-oriented design, the collaborative behaviour between two or more objects is
represented in terms of a co-operation, which is a sophisticated structural abstraction able to
represent complex interactions between objects. Instead of restricting the interaction between
objects to that of message passing, a co-operation is able to define the properties of a
collaborative activity that should hold interacting components. The representation of
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obtaining several aggregate behaviours without having to model and analyse the whole
behaviour of the actual objects involved in the co-operation. Instead of performing the
analysis of safety properties of a system in terms of its components, a co-operation is able to
capture in a single abstraction the roles of the system components involved in fulfilling a
particular service, thus facilitating the process of safety analysis.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an introduction of the co-
operative object-oriented style which provides the appropriate abstractions for modelling and
analysing the safety properties of a system in terms of interactions between its components.
In section 3 we discuss the feasibility of the proposed approach in terms of a case study
which consists in specifying the destruction of a sounding rocket with the purpose of
maintaining the safety requirements. Finally, section 4 concludes with a discussion evaluating
our contribution and indicating directions for future work.
2.  Co-operative Object-Oriented Architectural Style
Systems are defined by their components and the relationships among their components,
hence when modelling systems using an object-oriented (OO) approach, objects alone are
insufficient to describe the system behaviour. Co-operative Actions (CO actions) were
introduced for representing interactions between objects which characterise collaborative
behaviour /de Lemos 98/. One of the motivations for using CO actions in an OO approach is
the ability of CO actions to extract from the specification of an object those issues which are
related with its collaborative activities (although preserving object's encapsulation property),
thus avoiding a specification of a co-operation to be scattered among objects. CO actions are
a variant of Co-ordinated Atomic Actions (CA actions) /Xu 95, Randell 97/ which are design
mechanisms for structuring complex concurrent activities and supporting error recovery
between multiple interacting objects in an OO system.
The architectural elements of the co-operative object-oriented approach are objects and co-
operations. Objects can participate in more than one co-operation, and at least two objects
have to be associated with a co-operation which creates the context in which they collaborate.
In a co-operative object-oriented design, objects do not need to know which are the other
objects they interact with and the co-operations they participate, instead these
interdependencies are captured by co-operations. The internal structure of an object can be
decomposed into other objects and its behaviour refined by identifying new co-operations
between the decomposed objects. Also a co-operation can be functionally decomposed into
other co-operations, and also the participants of the co-operations can be decomposed into
other object participants.
As in object-oriented models, objects in the proposed approach, support the representation of
both structural and behavioural aspects of a system. An object is described by a template with
the following fields: a name, declaration of attributes in terms of constants and variables
which are local to the object, a description of its structure in terms of a collection of
components in composed of and the intra-relations between the object and its components,
and finally, a description of the behaviour of the object. The behaviour field includes the
initial state of the object, and behavioural assumptions or consistency invariants associated
with the object. The behavioural field also includes the specification of the complete space of
the behaviour of the object, in terms of its normal, exceptional and failure behaviours.
Normal and exceptional behaviours are related with the liveness properties of a system
(“something good" eventually happens), while failure behaviours are related with the safety
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exceptional behaviour comprises: the definition of the exceptional event, and the definition of
its respective handler in terms of the handler's start and finish events; the handler starts its
execution whenever an exception is raised and finishes when a set of sufficient and necessary
conditions are satisfied.
CO actions are employed in the specification of co-operative behaviour between objects. CO
actions can either co-ordinate the activities to be performed by the objects, or execute some
activity which is not associated with any particular object which takes part in the co-
operation, for example, raise an alarm when the states of several objects reach a combined
threshold condition. A CO action is described by a template with the following fields: the CO
action's name, declaration of attributes in terms of the names and types of the participants
of the CO action, constants and variables local to the CO action, and the specification of the
collaborative behaviour of the objects participating in the CO action. The template for
describing a CO action is the following:
CO Action:
attributes:
participants:
constants:
variables:
behaviour:
initial:
normal:
exceptional:
failure:
The initial state of a CO action represents its state when is activated, and is dissociated from
the pre-conditions of the CO action: it either refers to the state of objects participating in the
co-operation or the state of the variables local to the CO action. Associated with the
description of normal behaviour, pre-condition and post-condition establish the respective
conditions for a set of objects to start and finish a particular collaborative activity, and the
invariant establishes the conditions which should hold while the collaborative activity is
being performed. For the successful execution of a collaborative activity it is necessary that
the pre- and post-conditions of the normal behaviour are satisfied, and that the invariant
associated with the collaborative activity is not violated during its execution. For the
specification of exceptional behaviour, the invariant is replaced by a handler, which
identifies the exception event, together with the start and finish events associated with the
handler of the exception. Although the pre-conditions for normal and exceptional behaviours
are the same, the post-conditions for the exceptional behaviour might be different, depending
on the degraded outcomes of a CO action, once an exception has occurred. In the definition of
a CO action, an exception can be associated with the invariant whenever this is violated, or
with the post-conditions whenever one of the conditions is not satisfied.
A CO action provides the basis for dealing with both co-operative and competitive
concurrency by integrating two complementary concepts: conversations /Randell 75/ and
transactions /Gray 93/. Conversational support is used to control co-operative concurrency
and to implement co-ordinated and disciplined error recovery, whilst transactional support
maintains the consistency of shared resources in the presence of failures and concurrency
among different collaborative activities competing for these resources / Xu 95, Randell 97/.
63. Case Study: VS-40 Sounding Rocket
The purpose of sounding rockets is to carry scientific instruments on the payloads into space.
Their sub-orbital flight follows a parabolic trajectory which is appropriate for performing
scientific experiments. The VS-40 is a three stage sounding rocket which has a dual purpose
within the Brazilian Space Programme: apart from performing scientific experiments, it will
be used as an experimental platform for the new equipment of the Brazilian Satellite
Launcher (VLS). In this case study, we analyse the safety procedures for the destruction of
the rocket when its trajectory violates a pre-defined flight envelope. In particular, we
investigate the scenario in which the human operator decision to remotely destroy the rocket
coexists with an embedded system which is responsible for the self-destruction of the rocket.
In the following, we present the safety and mission requirements associated with the
sounding rocket VS-40, from which we extract the requirements for specifying the
destruction system. The specification of the destruction system is modelled using a co-
operative object-oriented approach, and the analysis of the safety properties is performed
using a model checker.
3.1. Safety and Mission Requirements of the VS-40
The safety requirements of the VS-40 system aim to maintain the integrity of the
environment1 of the vehicle (in terms of damages to property and loss of lives) when there is a
failure in the behaviour of the vehicle. Depending on the flight phase and the flight trajectory
of the vehicle, we can identify two types of accidents:
• during the pre-launching or during the initial flight instants, an unintentional
destruction of the vehicle can cause damages to the launching installations or the
loss of lives;
• during the rest of the flight, a failure in the behaviour of the vehicle can cause
damages to property or the loss of lives.
There are three hazards associated with the above accidents:
• during the pre-launching and initial flight instants, there is a destruction of the
vehicle;
• during the intermediate phases of the flight, the trajectory of the vehicle crosses the
line of the point of impact into an unprotected region, thus violating the flight safety
plan;
• during the final phase of the flight, there is an induced destruction of the vehicle.
Based on the above hazards, the safety requirements of the VS-40 system are the following:
• the vehicle cannot be destroyed during the initial and final phases of the flight;
• the vehicle has to be destroyed during the intermediate phases of the flight, once its
flight trajectory crosses the line of the point of impact2.
                                                
1
 In this paper we are not concerned with the integrity of the actual vehicle.
2
 There are other two scenarios in which the vehicle has to be destroyed, however these scenarios are related
with the integrity of the vehicle rather than the integrity of the environment: there is an improper separation in
one of the stages of the vehicle, and there is a violation on the structural parameters of the vehicle.
7The above safety requirements have to be considered in the context of the mission
requirements for the VS-40 system which states that the vehicle should not be destroyed
unintentionally in normal conditions during the flight.
3.2. Requirements for the Destruction System of the VS-40
The destruction system for the VS-40 vehicle is composed of an integrated procedure for the
remote destruction and self-destruction of the vehicle. In this integrated procedure the
operator should always be able to interfere with the decision for destroying the vehicle,
except when the remote control, which commands the destruction, is not operational. The
destruction system should include a safety protection mechanism to avoid the destruction of
the VS-40 during the initial and final phases of the flight. The initial phase of the flight
comprises the pre-launching until five seconds after the rupture of the umbilical (the cables
which connect the sounding rocket to the launching pad). The final phase of the flight starts
with the burnout of the second stage of the rocket (and the beginning of coasting), until the
end of the flight with the release of the payload. During the intermediate phases of the flight,
the safety operator should be able to destroy the sounding rocket when the flight safety plan is
violated.
3.2.1. Requirements for the Remote Destruction of the Vehicle
The remote destruction is a safety procedure which permits the safety operator to destroy the
vehicle when the flight safety plan is violated. The decision for the destruction of the vehicle
is taken by the safety operator, and the command for destruction is sent to the vehicle by the
remote control. The remote destruction of the vehicle depends on the following information:
• visual information from the CCTV;
• tracking information from the radar;
• telemetry information from the vehicle.
There are two circumstances in which the decision for destroying the vehicle is transferred
from the safety operator to the self-destruction mechanism of the vehicle:
• when the remote control fails (detected by the vehicle);
• when there is no tracking information from the radar (detected by the safety
operator).
Except for these circumstances, the safety operator should always be able to destroy remotely
the vehicle.
3.2.2. Requirements for the Self-Destruction of the Vehicle
The self-destruction is a safety procedure which permits the vehicle to destroy itself when the
flight safety plan is violated. The self-destruction of the vehicle is enabled when either the
remote control fails or there is no tracking information. For the destruction to be activated, it
depends on the flight trajectory of the vehicle in relation with the line of the point of impact,
and whether the engines of the rocket are still burning. It might be the case that although the
vehicle has crossed the line of the point of impact (outside the protected zone), the vehicle
8has enough momentum to cross back into the protected zone. The self-destruction of the
vehicle is disabled once it enters the final phases of the flight.
The requirement which states that the safety operator should be able to overwrite any decision
by the self-destruction mechanism (except for the two circumstances mentioned above) might
have to be reviewed in the future once enough confidence is obtained on the dependability of
the self-destruction mechanism. If the remote destruction feature is removed from the design
of the VS-40 system, this would simplify the design of the vehicle by eliminating the remote
control subsystem, and remove from the safety procedures the socio-technical aspects of
involving a human operator in the decision of destroying the vehicle.
3.3. Co-operative Object-Oriented Design
In this section, we present a partial model of the sounding rocket VS-40 from the viewpoint
of the safety requirements. The co-operative object-oriented model of the system will focus
on the components and the interactions that are responsible for the destruction of the
sounding rocket.
From  the diagram of figure 1, the three basic components of the VS-40 System are: the
SafetyOperator, the OperatorConsole, and the VS-40 Vehicle. For the purpose of the
destruction system, the relevant components of the OperatorConsole are: CCTV which
provides the visual information of the vehicle’s flight trajectory, the SISGRAF which
provides tracking information from the radar, the Telemetry which provides measures of the
key variables that define the state of the vehicle, and the RemoteControl which allows the
OperatorConsole to send control commands to the vehicle. The relevant components of the
Vehicle are: the Trajectory which calculates the flight trajectory of the vehicle based on
information provided by the Inertial Reference System (IRS) and establishes whether the
flight safety plan is violated, the SafetyBox which provides the protection mechanism to
avoid the unintentional destruction of the vehicle during the initial and final phases of the
flight, the RemoteControl which receives, and processes, the control commands from the
OperatorConsole (it contains a self-diagnostic mechanism which detects whether has failed
or not), and the Telemetry which is responsible for collecting and transmitting to the
OperatorConsole the measures of key variables of the vehicle.
Also in figure 1, two CO actions are identified: RemoteDestruction which describes the
collaborative behaviour of all components of the VS-40 System which are involved in the
destruction of the vehicle by the SafetyOperator, and SelfDestruction which describes the
collaborative behaviour of the components of the Vehicle responsible for its self-destroying
the Vehicle. The role of these CO actions within the design of the destruction system is to
extract from the definition of the components of the Vehicle those activities which are
exclusive of the destruction system, in other words, any additional feature which is not part of
the original definition of a component becomes part of a CO action. In the next section, we
proceed in describing in more detail the above two CO actions.
3.4. Modelling of the Co-operative Behaviour
In the following, the CO actions RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction will be formally
specified in terms of Extended Real-Time Logic (ERTL) /de Lemos 96, Hall 96/ (an outline
of ERTL is presented in the Appendix) following the template previously presented. For the
specification of normal and failure behaviours, the occurrence number associated with the
9definitions of the occurrence and holding relations will be suppressed without loss of detail
(the conditions to obtain equivalence, for example, between Θ(e, i, t) and Θ(e, t) were
presented elsewhere /de Lemos 96, Hall 96/). Exceptional behaviour will not be specified for
this case study, although it has been considered as part of the specification of a production
cell /de Lemos 99b/.
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Figure 1. Co-operative object-oriented design of the destruction system.
The CO action RemoteDestruction specifies the activities of the components of the VS-40
System involved in the remote destruction of the Vehicle by the SafetyOperator. The
normal behaviour pre-condition establishes the start of RemoteDestruction at the instant
that the destruction of the Vehicle is enabled by the SafetyBox (v.sb.enDestruction), while
the RemoteControl and the SISGRAF are operational (respectively, v.rc.operational and
oc.sisgraf.operational). The invariant states that for the RemoteDestruction to be active,
the destruction of the Vehicle should remain enabled, and the RemoteControl and
SISGRAF should remain operational. The actual destruction of the Vehicle is activated by
the SafetyOperator (so.actDestruction) whenever the information provided by the CCTV,
SISGRAF or Telemetry detects that the flight trajectory of the Vehicle is outside the safety
plan (oc.cctv.outsideSP, oc.sisgraf.outsideSP, and oc.tl.outsideSP), while the
destruction of the Vehicle is still enabled. The post-condition of RemoteDestruction is
captured by a transition event predicate that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the co-operation to end: when the destruction of the Vehicle is disabled (during the initial
and final phases of the flight), when there is no tracking information from the radar
(SISGRAF not operational) or the RemoteControl fails, or when the Vehicle is destroyed
(v.destroyed). The specification of the failure behaviour for the RemoteDestruction is
based on the safety requirements for the VS-40 System, presented in section 3.1. The
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System enters into the first hazard state (Hazard_remoteDestruction) when the Vehicle is
either in the initial or final phases of the flight (respectively, v.initialPhase and
v.finalPhase), and the SafetyOperator activates its destruction while the RemoteControl
is operational and the destruction of the Vehicle is enabled by the SafetyBox. The System
enters into the second hazard state (Hazard_remoteDestruction) when during the
intermediate phases of the flight (v.intermediatePhase), the flight trajectory of the Vehicle
is outside the safety plan, but the SafetyOperator does not activate the destruction. These
two hazard states correspond, respectively, to commission and omission faults that might
occur in the System.
RemoteDestruction:
attributes:
participants:
so Operator
oc.cctv CCTV
oc.sisgraf SISGRAF
oc.tl Telemetry
v Vehicle
v.rc RemoteControl
v.sb SafetyBox
behaviour:
initial:
Φ(oc.sisgraf.operational ∧ v.rc.operational ∧ ¬v.sb.enDestruction ∧ ¬v.sb.actDestruction, 0)
normal:
pre-condition:
∀t• Θ(ÊremoteDestruction, t) ⇔
Θ(Ê(v.sb.enDestruction ∧ v.rc.operational ∧ oc.sisgraf.operational), t)
invariant:
∀t• Φ(remoteDestruction, t) ⇔
Φ(v.sb.enDestruction ∧ v.rc.operational ∧ oc.sisgraf.operational, t)
∀t• Θ(Êso.actDestruction, t) ⇔  Φ(remoteDestruction, t) ∧
Θ(Ê(oc.cctv.outsideSP ∨ oc.sisgraf.outsideSP ∨ oc.tl.outsideSP), t)
post-condition:
∀t• Θ(ÌremoteDestruction, t) ⇔
Θ(Ìv.sb.enDestruction, t) ∨ Θ(Ê(¬v.rc.operational ∨ ¬ oc.sisgraf.operational), t) ∨
Θ(Êv.destroyed, t)
failure:
∀t• Θ(Êhazard_remoteDestruction, t) ⇔ Φ(remoteDestruction, t) ∧
Φ(v.initialPhase ∨ v.finalPhase, t) ∧ Φ(v.rc.operational ∧ v.sb.enDestruction, t) ∧
Θ(Êso.actDestruction, t)
∀t• Θ(Êhazard_remoteDestruction, t) ⇔ Φ(remoteDestruction, t) ∧
Φ(v.intermediatePhase, t) ∧
Φ(v.rc.operational ∧ oc.sisgraf.operational ∧  v.sb.enDestruction, t) ∧
Θ(Ê(oc.cctv.outsideSP ∨ oc.sisgraf.outsideSP ∨ oc.tl.outsideSP), t) ∧
¬Θ(Êso.actDestruction, t)
The CO action SelfDestruction specifies the collaborative activities of the components of
the Vehicle for its self-destruction. The SelfDestruction starts when either the
RemoteControl or the SISGRAF (v.rc.sisgrafSP - we assume that the RemoteControl is
able to signal the Vehicle when there is no tracking information) become inoperative, while
the destruction of the Vehicle is enabled. The invariant states that the Vehicle will be able to
self-destroy when the destruction is enabled by the SafetyBox, and when either the
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RemoteControl or the SISGRAF are inoperative. The destruction of the Vehicle is
activated by the component Trajectory (v.tr.actDestruction) when it detects that the
Vehicle has violated the flight safety plan (v.tr.outsideSP). The post-condition states that
the components of the Vehicle should leave the SelfDestruction co-operation when one of
the following conditions holds true: the destruction of the Vehicle is disabled, both the
RemoteControl and SISGRAF become operational, and the Vehicle is destroyed. In
summary, depending on the operational state of the RemoteControl and SISGRAF the VS-
40 System will switch between RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction while the
destruction of the Vehicle is enabled and the Vehicle is in the intermediate phases of the
flight. The specification of the failure behaviour for the SelfDestruction is also based on the
safety requirements for the VS-40 System. The System enters into the first hazard state
(Hazard_selfDestruction), related with commission faults, when the Vehicle is either in the
initial or final phases of the flight, and the Trajectory activates the destruction while the
destruction of the Vehicle is enabled by the SafetyBox. The System enters into the second
hazard state (Hazard_remoteDestruction), related with omission faults, when the flight
trajectory of the Vehicle is outside the safety plan, but the Trajectory does not activate the
destruction.
SelfDestruction:
attributes:
participants:
v Vehicle
v.rc RemoteControl
v.sb SafetyBox
v.tr Trajectory
behaviour:
initial:
Φ(¬v.sb.enDestruction ∧ v.rc.operational ∧ v.rc.sisgrafOp, 0)
normal:
pre-condition:
∀t• Θ(ÊselfDestruction, t) ⇔
Θ(Ê(v.sb.enDestruction ∧ (¬v.rc.operational ∨ ¬v.rc.sisgrafOp)), t)
invariant:
∀t• Φ(selfDestruction, t) ⇔
Φ(v.sb.enDestruction ∧ (¬v.rc.operational ∨ ¬v.rc.sisgrafOp), t)
∀t• Θ(Êv.tr.actDestruction, t) ⇔  Φ(selfDestruction, t) ∧ Θ(Êv.tr.outsideSP, t)
post-condition:
∀t• Θ(ÌselfDestruction, t) ⇔
Θ(Ìv.sb.enDestruction, t) ∨ Θ(Ê(v.rc.operational ∧ v.rc.sisgrafOp), t) ∨
Θ(Êv.destroyed, t)
failure:
∀t• Θ(Êhazard_selfDestruction, t) ⇔ Φ(selfDestruction, t) ∧
Φ(v.initialPhase ∨ v.finalPhase, t) ∧ Φ(v.sb.enDestruction, t) ∧
Θ(Êv.tr.actDestruction, t)
∀t• Θ(Êhazard_selfDestruction, t) ⇔ Φ(selfDestruction, t) ∧
Φ(v.intermediatePhase, t) ∧ Θ(Êv.tr.outsideSP, t) ∧ ¬Θ(Êv.tr.actDestruction, t)
3.5. Analysis of the Co-operative Behaviour
The analysis of the co-operative behaviour aims to obtain evidence that the specification of
normal behaviour described in the CO actions is able to maintain the safe properties of the
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system, which are specified by their failure behaviour. In order to confirm that the combined
normal behaviour of CO actions RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction is able to
maintain the safety of the system, we use model checking which is a formal verification
technique based on state exploration. Given a state transition system and a property, model
checking algorithms exhaustedly explore the state space to determine whether the system
satisfies the property. The result is either a claim that the property is true or a counter-
example in terms of a sequence of states that falsifies a property /Chan 98/.
In the following, the CO actions RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction will be analysed
using the model checker HYTECH, which is an automated tool for the analysis of real-time
and hybrid systems /Hezinger 95/. (Other model checkers, like SMV /McMillan 93/ or SPIN
/Holzmann 97/, could have also been used since there are no hybrid properties, related to the
existence of continuous and discrete variables, in the current description of the case study).
The operational representation of the normal behaviour of a CO action is modelled using
hybrid automata. The specification of this automata is obtained directly from the ERTL
formulas that define the normal behaviour. The safety properties to be analysed are obtained
from the specification of failure behaviour of a CO action. The analysis of safety properties is
performed by reachability analysis (the only method offered by HYTECH for checking the
properties of the hybrid automata model), hence the safety properties are expressed as
automata states to be avoided. The system context for conducting the safety analysis of the
CO actions is provided by other three automata. The first automaton represents the main
phases in the flight of the Vehicle, that is, the initial and final phases, the two intermediate
phases, and the destruction of the Vehicle. The other two automata represent the system
variables that can affect the flight of the Vehicle, namely, whether the equipment is
operational, and whether the flight trajectory is outside the safety plan.
The safety analysis of the CO actions RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction will focus
on the problem of transferring the decision for destroying the Vehicle from the
SafetyOperator to the component Trajectory of the Vehicle: the destruction of the Vehicle
either by the RemoteDestruction or SelfDestruction should be mutually excludent. The
two diagrams of figure 2 show the automata which describe the behaviour of CO actions
RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction. For both diagrams the destruction of the Vehicle
will be enabled (v.sb.enDestruction) five seconds after the rupture of the umbilical, and
disabled (¬v.sb.enDestruction) with the burnout of the second stage until the end of the
flight. In RemoteDestruction, the SafetyOperator detects that the flight trajectory is
outside the safety plan from information provided by the CCTV, SISGRAF, and Telemetry.
The destruction of the Vehicle should follow once the SafetyOperator activates the
destruction (so.actDestruction) and the RemoteControl is operational (v.rc.operational).
The co-operation SelfDestruction is enabled whenever the RemoteControl
(¬v.rc.operational) or the SISGRAF (¬v.rc.sisgrafOp) become inoperative. When the
component Trajectory detects that the flight trajectory of the Vehicle is outside the safety
plan (v.tr.outsideSP), it issues a command for destroying the Vehicle (v.tr.actDestruction).
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Figure 2. Operational representation of the collaborative activities of the CO actions.
For the analysis of the safety properties of CO actions RemoteDestruction and
SelfDestruction we have used the HYTECH reachability analysis for searching for those
states in the state space of the hybrid automata that violate the safety properties (described in
the definition of a CO action by the failure behaviour that should be avoided). In the
following, for sake of brevity, we focus on the hazards associated with commission faults.
The safety requirement associated with these hazards state that the vehicle cannot be
destroyed during the initial and final phases of the flight. In terms of the analysis language of
HYTECH, the automata state to be avoided for CO action RemoteDestruction is:
final_reg := (loc[flightPhases] = FP_l1 | loc[flightPhases] = FP_l4) &
v.rc.operational = 1 & v.sb.enDestruction = 1 & so.actDestruction = 1;
The locations FP_l1 and FP_l4 of the FlightPhases automata correspond, respectively, to
initial and final phases of the flight. For CO action SelfDestruction the automata state to be
avoided is:
final_reg := (loc[flightPhases] = FP_l1 | loc[flightPhases] = FP_l4) &
v.sb.enDestruction = 1 & v.tr.actDestruction = 1;
Both CO actions were confirmed to be safe within the system context provided, hence
showing that both RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction are able to maintain their
safety properties. The next step is to check whether the combined behaviour of actions
RemoteDestruction and SelfDestruction is able to avoid the System hazard associated
with commission faults, which can be formalised in terms of ERTL, as follows:
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∀t• Θ(Êhazard_Commission, t) ⇔
Φ(v.initialPhase ∨ v.finalPhase, t) ∧ Θ(Êv.destroyed, t)
The System enters into a hazard state whenever the Vehicle is destroyed during the initial
and final phases of the flight. This scenario can be represented in terms of the analysis
language of HYTECH as the automata states that are to be avoided:
final_reg := (loc[flightPhases] = FP_l1 | loc[flightPhases] = FP_l4) &
(loc[remoteDestruction] = RD_l8 | loc[selfDestruction] = SD_l8);
Using the reachability analysis of HYTECH, we have confirmed that the above states do not
occur considering the specifications of CO actions RemoteDestruction and
SelfDestruction, and that of the system context. Hence, we can conclude that the System is
safe for those hazards associated with commission faults. The same rationale could also be
followed to confirm that the System is safe for those hazards associated with omission faults.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an approach in which the process of safety analysis of
complex safety-critical systems can be enhanced by extracting from the definition of the
system components the behavioural dependencies associated with their interactions. Co-
operative actions (CO actions) were used as modelling abstractions for representing these
interactions, and model checking was employed for verifying whether the behavioural
specifications of a CO actions were able to maintain the system safety requirements. The
feasibility of the whole approach was demonstrated through the specification of the
destruction system of a sounding rocket, which involves several components, including a
human operator.
The proposed approach is able to enhance the process of safety analysis of more traditional
safety analysis approaches. These traditional approaches rely on the behavioural specification
of all the system components as a means for obtaining confidence that the interactions
between components will not affect the safety of the system. A possible direction for future
work would be to integrate the safety analysis of CO actions with other approaches used for
conducting the safety analysis of object-oriented designs, such as the impact structure /Cepin
97/. In this paper, model checking was used as a verification method for analysing the safety
properties of a CO action. However, inaccuracies can be introduced while transforming
ERTL formula, defining normal and failure behaviours of a CO action, into an hybrid
automaton and a set of unreachable automata states. Hence the need for validating both the
operational and property models before conclusions can be drawn about properties of the
operational model. A possible direction for future work would be to integrate validation
techniques, such as traditional safety analysis techniques, with the process of model checking
/de Lemos 99a/.
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Appendix - Extended Real Time Logic (ERTL)
Extended Real Time Logic (ERTL) /de Lemos 96, Hall 96/ is a first order predicate logic for
the modelling and analysis of hybrid systems, taking as a basis Jahanian & Mok's Real Time
Logic (RTL) /Jahanian 86, Jahanian 88/. RTL uses uninterpreted predicates to relate events of
a system to the time of their occurrence, thereby providing the means for reasoning about
absolute timing properties of real-time systems. The extensions provided by ERTL allow
reasoning about system behaviour in both value and time domains through predicates defined
in terms of system variables.
The occurrence relation (Θ) captures the notion of real time by assigning a time value to each
occurrence of an event. Θ(e, i, t) defines that the ith occurrence of event e occurs at time t.
∀t•∀i∈P: Θ(Motor_On, i, t)
The ith occurrence of event MotorOn has occurred at time t.
A transition event is defined by the transition of a system predicate from false to true, or from
true to false, at a particular time point. For a system predicate P, the respective transition
events are ÊP and ÌP.
∀t•∀i∈P: Θ(ÌplateOnBeg, i, t) ⇔ Θ(Ê(plateOnEnd ∧ ¬beltOn), i, t)
The transition event which captures the instant which of the predicate plateOnBeg
becomes false is equivalent to the transition event which captures the instant that the
conjunction of plateOnBeg and the negation of beltOn becomes true.
The holding relation (Φ) captures whether a system predicate holds true at a time point. Φ(f,
i, t) defines that a formula f holds for the ith time, at time t.
∀t•∀i∈P: Φ(moveDown, i, t) ⇔ Φ(¬bottom ∧ ¬plateOn, i, t)
The predicate moveDown holds true iff the conjunction of the negating predicates
bottom and plateOn also holds true.
